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Florida Supreme Court. B e c au s e
the encounter took place in the
cramped confines of a bus, Bostick
argued that the police presence was
much more intimidating than it
would be in another setting. Bostick,
111 S. Ct. at 2386. Reversing the
lower courts' decision, the Florida
Supreme Court held that a seizure
resulted when the police officers
randomly boarded the bus and without articulable suspicion, asked for
the passengers' consent to search
their luggage. Id. at 2385 (citing
554So.2dat1154(Fla.1989». The
court reasoned that a seizure occurred because a reasonable passenger "would not have felt free to
leave the bus to avoid questioning
by the police." Id. The court thus
adopted a perse rule that bus searches
were unconstitutional. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Florida
per se rule was compatible with
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
In addressing the issue ofwhether
a police encounter of this nature
constituted a "seizure" within the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme
Court outlined established case law
which demonstrated that "a seizure
does not occur simply because a
police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions."
Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386. The
Court stated that "[s]o long as a
reasonable person would feel free
'to disregard the police and go about
his business,' the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion
is required." Id. (citing California
v. HodariD., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551
(1991».
The Court then rejected Bostick's
claim that his case was different
because it took place in the cramped
quarters of a bus. The Court reasoned that Bostick's movements
were confined not because police
conduct was "coercive," but because

-

he was a passenger on a bus that was
scheduled to depart. Id. at 2387.
Because a person traveling on a bus
has no desire to leave, the presence
of the police was not an accurate
measurement ofthe coerciveness of
the encounter. Id.
The Court then cited INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984),
which it found to be dispositive of
the issue. In Delgado, the Court
held that a seizure had not occurred
when workers were questioned in
their workplace and were not free to
leave without being questioned. Id.
(citing Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218).
The Court observed that the officers' conduct provided the workers
with no reason to believe that they
would be detained if they refused to
answer any questions. Id. The
Delgado Court emphasized that the
workers' ability to leave was not
restricted by the police officers, but
by voluntary obligations to their
employers. Id.
The Court stated that Bostick's
case was analytically indistinguishable from Delgado. Id. Like the
workers in Delgado, the Court reasoned that Bostick's movement was
restricted by a factor independent of
the police conduct. Id. Therefore,
according to the Court, the "free to
leave" analysis used by the Florida
Supreme Court was not the correct
inquiry. Id. The Court held instead
that the "appropriate inquiry is
whether a reasonable person would
feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter." Id. The location ofthe
encounter is only one ofthe factors
to be considered in determining
whether a seizure had occurred. Id.
In observing that its opinion is
consistent with prior decisions, the
Court noted that it has previously
stated that ''the crucial test is whether,
taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encoun-

ter, the police conduct would 'have
communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to
ignore the police presence and go
about his business.''' Id. (citing
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567, 569 (1988». Consequently,
the Court held that it was not per se
unconstitutional for police officers
to board buses and randomly request passengers' consent to search
their luggage. Id. at 2389. In light
of its decision, the Court remanded
the case to the Florida courts to
determine whether a seizure took
place.
Although the Supreme Court
claimed that no new ground was
broken by its decision, it is now
clear that police officers may pursue
drug interdiction efforts on buses.
Prior Court decisions have allowed
police officers to question individuals in such places as the workplace,
in airport lobbies, and on city streets.
The reasoning in Florida v. Bostick
indicates that individuals will no
longer be immune from police questioning in many other public places.
The Court's decision has sent a
message that police may question
individuals anywhere they please so
long as the encounter is not coercive.
- Will Jacobi

Craig v. State: THE COURT OF
APPEALS REDEFINES
WHEN AN ABUSED CHILD
IS CONSIDERED SUFFICIENTL Y UNAVAILABLE TO
TESTIFY AND ALLOWS FOR
THE TAKING OF TESTIMONY BY CLOSED-CIRCUIT
TELEVISION.
In a case of constitutional import, the Court of Appeals of Maryland clarified when it is appropriate
for a trial court judge to order the
testimony ofa child abuse victim to
be taken outside the courtroom
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throughclosed-circuittelevision. In
Craig v. State, 588 A.2d 328 (Md.
1991), the court established flexible
guidelines forjudges to follow when
confronted with the invocation of
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §
9-102 (1989), which permits child
abuse victims to testify through
closed-circuit television.
Sandra Ann Craig was indicted
on six counts stemming from the
alleged sexual assault of a six year
old child. Prior to trial in the Circuit
Court for Howard County, the state
invoked Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code
Ann. § 9-102 (1989). Despite
Craig's Sixth Amendment confrontation-based objections, the child
witnesses were permitted to testify
via one-way, closed-circuit television. Craig was subsequently convicted on all six counts. Craig, 588
A.2d at 330. After affirmance by
the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, the court of appeals reversed. On appeal to the Supreme
Court ofthe United States, the Court
reversed the court of appeals and
remanded the case for reconsideration. Id.
Upon reconsideration, the court
of appeals quoted the Supreme Court
at length, holding that the trial
judge's use of closed-circuit television was inappropriate without a
"case specific finding of necessity."
Id. at 331 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012,1025 (1988)). Thecourt
first reasoned that the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause
did not prohibit a witness from testifying outside of the defendant's
physical presence where closed-circuit television was used. Specifically, the "degree of necessity that
supports [the] use of a procedure ..
. that would otherwise not satisfy
theconfrontationrequirements" was
a showing of witness unavailability.
Id. at 333.
Furthermore, the court of ap-
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peals followed its ruling in
Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275,
289 (Md. 1987), which stated that a
child witness who suffered serious
emotional distress was sufficiently
unavailable to satisfy the relinquishment of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confront a witness testifying against him or her.
Id. at333. The court, however, held
that the finding of unavailability
must be based upon a "particularized examination of all circumstances concerning the impact of
public testimony in the presence of
the defendant upon the emotional
health of the child." Id. (citing
Wildermuth, 530 A.2dat289)). The
court's holding established that the
use of such a drastic procedure must
be preceded by the judge "mak[ ing]
a specific finding that testimony by
the child in the courtroom in the
presence of the defendant would
result in the child suffering serious
emotional distress .... " Id. at 331
(quoting Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.
Ct 3157, 3170 ( 1990) (citing Craig
v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Md.
1989) (Craig I))) (emphasis in original).
The court reasoned that the pressure of such a confrontation burdened the child with severe emotional stress and fear, thus inhibiting the child's ability to communicate. Id. at 333. The court, however, stressed the importance that
the finding o funavailability be based
on the impact of the public testimony on that particular child, as
opposed to children in general.
Despite the Supreme Court's holding that the trial judge could base his
invocation of section 9-102 solely
on the findings of an expert, the
Court of Appeals ofMaryland stated
that, "expert testimony may not be
necessary to establish the necessary
predicate' to invoke § 9-102." Craig,
588 A.2d at 335 (quoting

Wildermuth, 530 A.2d at 275).
To avoid confusion, the court of
appeals established specific guidelines for trial court judges to follow
when confronted with a prosecutor's
motion to have achildtestify through
closed-circuit television. See Md.
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9102 (1989). First and foremost,
"[t]he trial judge shall make a casespecific finding of necessity ...."
Craig, 588 A.2d at 335. Next, the
availability of the child shall be
addressed, with special consideration given to the child's ability to
testify in the presence of the accused. Ordinarily, this shall be determined by the ''judge personally
observing and interviewing the
child," however, such interaction
"under § 9-102 . . . should be the
rule rather than the exception."
Craig, 588 A.2d at 335-36. Additionally, the judge may decide
whether or not the defendant may be
present during questioning. Id. The
judge then shall decide on the necessity of expert testimony. However,
the court of appeals firmly believed
thatthe trial court judge was capable
of making the decision on his or her
own, and only need consider the use
of expert testimony. Finally, the
judge shall have full control over
''the means by which the procedure
shall be effected .... " Id. at 336.
The court added that the prudent
judge should consider the "reasonable availability of measures which
would be the least restrictive of the
right of confrontation, yet serve the
purpose of § 9-102 .... " Id.
The companion case of Gilbert
v. State, 588 A.2d 328 (Md. 1991),
similarly depicted an adult accused
of child abuse. Like Craig, the state
sought to invoke section 9-102.
Gilbert objected, and after much
debate, the judge decided to interview the child in his chambers,
joined by both counsel and the ste-

nographer, but not by the defendant.
The child was openly frightened of
the defendant, therefore, the judge
concluded that the child was not
emotionally prepared to testify in
open court before the defendant.
Accordingly, the judge decided that
a two-way television should be used
in such a way that both the child and
the defendant could see one another
without actual confrontation.
Gilbert's motion fora new trial was
denied and he received a fifteen year
prison sentence. Craig, 588 A.2d at
336. Gilbert appealed, but before
the court of special appeals had an
opportunity to decide the case, the
court of appeals issued a writ of
certiorari. Id. at 337.
The defendant claimed that the
trial judge erred in permitting the
section 9-1 02 procedure without first
examining the child victim testifying in the presence.ofthe defendant.
Id. at 338. Nevertheless, the court
of appeals upheld the trial court
judge's findings, basing its decision
on two rationales: (1) the trial court
judge did not have the guidance of
Craig I nor Maryland v. Craig,
which favors the initial interview in
front of the defendant; and (2) the
court ruled that it was within the
trial court judge's discretion whether
or not to allow the defendant to be
present. Id. at 338-39.
In summary, Gilbert's case was
decided differently than Craig's
due to the trial court judge's personal examination of the child prior
to her testifying. The judge made a
case-specific finding, and concluded
that the child was unable to testify in
open court without subjecting herselfto serious emotional trauma. Id.
at 339.
Craig and Gilbert established a
set of guidelines, not a rigid formula, for trial court judges to follow
in child abuse cases. The ruling in
Craig leaves a tremendous amount

of discretion in the hands ofthe trial
court judge. Gilbert indicates that
so long as the trial judge makes an
individualized evaluation of the
child's emotional health, his or her
decision to implement section 9102 will be upheld. These cases
demonstrate an effort to provide further guidelines in child abuse cases,
and in so doing, the court ofappeals
has pushed the right of confrontation to its constitutional limits in an
all out effort to protect abused children.
- Andrew S. Kasmer
Board of Oklahoma City v.
Dowell: FEDERAL COURT
SUPERVISION OF PREVIOUSL Y SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS MAY BE TERMINATED IF SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH DESEGREGATION OBJECTIVES HAS BEEN ATTAINED
In Board of Oklahoma City v.
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991), the
United States Supreme Court promulgated a standard for dissolving
desegregation decrees. Specifically,
the Court ruled that a federal district
court may lift a desegregation decree if a school district can show
that it has complied with the decree
in good faith and that vestiges of
past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable. If a
decree is to be terminated or dissolved, the parties are entitled to a
detailed statement to that effect from
the court.
In 1972, the Board of Education
of Oklahoma City was ordered to
adopt a court-supervised desegregation plan involving busing. This
plan was designed to integrate the
schools in its district and end de jure
segregation. After complying with
the desegregation decree for five
years, the Board moved in 1977 to
end court supervision of the plan.
After finding that the Board had

substantially complied with the constitutional requirements and that lack
of court supervision would not be
detrimental to the unitary system
the Board had achieved, the district
court terminated its jurisdiction in
the case.
In 1984, the Board adopted the
Student Reassignment Plan (SRP).
This plan was designed to alleviate
greater burdens placed on blackchildren caused by demographic changes
in the area that resulted in longer
busing routes. In 1985, the respondents, black students and their parents, asked the district court to reopen the case, contending that the
school district had not achieved ''unitary" status and that SRP was a
return to segregation. Id. at 634.
The district court refused to re-open
the case, holding that its 1977 finding that the school system was ''unitary" was res judicata and that the
school system had remained unitary. Id. The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit reversed, and held
thatthe 1977 orderdidnotterminate
the original injunction. Id.
The court of appeals remanded
the case for the district court to
determine if the injunction should
be lifted or modified. On remand,
the district court vacated the injunction because it found that the previously ordered desegregation plan
was unworkable dueto demographic
changes, the school district had
maintained its unitary status, and
that the SRP was not designed with
discriminatory intent. Id. at 634-35.
The Court of Appeals again reversed. Id. at 635. Relying on
United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106
(1932), the court ruled that the injunction should remain in effect until
the school district could show that
its existence was causing a "grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions." Dowell, 111
S. Ct. at 635 (quoting Swift, 286
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